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Matson: Waiver of Soveriegn Immunity - Did Congress Intend to Exempt Fede

WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-Did Congress Intend to
Exempt Federal Facilities From Civil Penalties Under the Clean

Water Act? United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.
Ct. 1627 (1992).
Fernald, Ohio, is the site of a 1,050-acre Department of Energy
(DOE) uranium processing plant, known as the Feed Materials
Production Center. The Fernald plant processes uranium for the
production of nuclear weapons' and has been operated by private
contractors under management contracts with the DOE.' In March
1986, the State of Ohio filed suit 3 against the DOE, the Secretary of
Energy, and DOE's private contractors, 4 alleging violations of federal5
and state pollution laws. 6 More specifically, Ohio's claims included
illegal dumping of hazardous waste, inadequate monitoring to detect
groundwater contamination from hazardous waste, and failing to
inspect regularly. Ohio further claimed the Fernald plant had
discharged excessive contaminants into the Great Miami River7 and
had released radioactive contaminants into the air, soil and water,
including wells on adjacent property. Based on these and additional
claims, the State of Ohio asked for injunctive relief, damages, civil
penalties and declaratory relief. 9
DOE filed a motion to dismiss and stay on November 7, 1986.10
The hearing on DOE's motion to dismiss was held on January 28,
1. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
2. Id. The private contractors at the plant were NLO, Inc. and NL Industries, Inc. Ohio
v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 1988), aff'd, 904 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
3. Charges were filed in federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio.
4. Brief for the Petitioner at 11, United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct.
1627 (1992) (Nos. 90-1341, 90-1517) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
5. Federal claims were brought under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean
Water Act or CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. 111990), the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988), as amended by Federal Facility
Compliance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993), and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
6. State pollution claims were brought under the Ohio Solid & Hazardous Waste Control
Act, OIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3734 (Baldwin 1989 & Supp. 1990), and the Ohio Water Pollution
Control Act, Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 6111 (Baldwin 1991).
7. The Great Miami River flows into the Ohio River, which then makes its way into
Kentucky.
8. Brief for Respondent State of Ohio at 8, United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio,
112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992) (Nos. 90-1341, 90-1517) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
9. Ohio, 689 F. Supp. at 761.
10. Id. DOE sought to dismiss Count I, which stipulated the recovery of response (removal or remedial) costs under CERCLA, and to stay Count I1, which sought natural resource
damages under CERCLA. DOE asked that all other counts be dismissed: injunctive relief and
civil penalties under RCRA and the Ohio Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Act and injunctive
relief and civil penalties under the CWA and the Ohio Water Pollution Control Act. Id.
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1988.11 At that time, the parties had agreed that Count I, for recovery
of response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), was withdrawn and that
Count II, for natural resource damages under CERCLA, was stayed
pending completion of a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/

FS). 12 On all other counts, claims for injunctive relief were withdrawn
with only civil penalty claims remaining. 3 The parties also agreed on
the amount of civil penalties DOE would owe if found liable.14 At
the hearing, DOE moved to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on the doctrine of
federal sovereign immunity.'" DOE pressed for the clear statement
rule, which requires that Congress state its intention
to waive federal
6
sovereign immunity in clear unmistakable terms.
The federal district court found that both the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
waived federal sovereign immunity for civil penalties under their
respective federal-facilities and citizen-suit sections. 7 The district court
held that it had authority to impose civil penalties under both the
CWA and RCRA.'5 With respect to the claims under the Ohio Solid
and Hazardous Waste Control Act 19 and the Ohio Water Pollution
Control Act, 20 the court ruled that the State of Ohio could recover
civil penalties if it could prove facts supporting state law claims. 2'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding
that Congress had waived sovereign immunity with respect to civil

11. Ohio, 689 F. Supp. at 761.
12. A remedial investigation (RI) "is a process undertaken by the lead agency to determine
the nature and extent of the problem presented by the release." 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1992). A
feasibility study (FS) "means a study undertaken by the lead agency to develop and evaluate
options for remedial action." Id.
13. Ohio, 689 F. Supp. at 761.
14. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (1992).
15. "A judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without
its consent."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1991). The Supreme Court has upheld

this doctrine, "[wle may lay the postulate that without specific statutory consent, no suit may
be brought against the United States." United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940).
16. Brief of Petitioner, supro note 4, at 14-15.
17. Ohio, 689 F. Supp. at 767.
18. Id. at 765.
19. Section 3734.13(C) provides that the state attorney general may bring an action for
any violation of the state hazardous waste statutes and that "[tihe court may impose ... a
civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars for each day of each violation." Section
3734.13(E) states that "[mloneys resulting from civil penalties .. .shall be paid into the hazardous waste clean-up fund." OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3734.13 (Baldwin 1989 & Supp. 1990)
(This is the amended version of the Act, but the changes are not significant to the issues in
this case).
20. Section 6111.09 provides in part that "[a]ny person who violates [state water pollution
regulations] shall pay a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars per day of violation." Oso REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.09 (Baldwin 1991) (This is the amended version of the
Act, but the changes arc not significant to the issues in this case).
21. Ohio, 689 F. Supp. at 765.
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penalties under the CWA's federal-facilities section 22 and RCRA's
citizen-suit section,2 3 but not with respect to RCRA's federal-facilities
section. 24 The court did not consider the citizen-suit section of the
CWA 21 since it found a clear waiver of sovereign immunity under
the CWA federal-facilities section.26 Judge Guy dissented, finding the
waivers in each statute too narrow to allow the imposition of civil
penalties against the United States. 7 Subsequently, DOE petitioned
for review of the Sixth Circuit ruling that Congress intended to waive
sovereign immunity for civil penalties in the CWA's civil-penalties
section and RCRA's citizen-suit section. Ohio cross-petitioned on the
court's ruling that RCRA's federal-facilities section failed to grant a
clear waiver. The petitions were consolidated
and the United States
2
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

1

In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and held
that Congress had not waived the federal government's sovereign
immunity with regard to civil penalties under the CWA or RCRA. 29
This casenote discusses the Supreme Court's analysis of federal
facilities' waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties under the
CWA. 30 It addresses the Court's failure to consider the intent behind
the statute and the language of the statutory sections at issue and
further discusses the concept of federalism as applied to federal
pollution law. It also looks at the legislative history of the 1977
Amendments to the CWA and the Clean Air Act (CAA)31 to discern
whether Congress did intend to exempt federal facilities from civil
penalties. Finally, this casenote discusses policy-based reasons for
assessing civil penalties against federal polluters and state options for
enforcement against federal facilities in light of United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio.

22. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)). See infra
text accompanying note 104.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988)).
See infra text accompanying note 98.
24. 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op 1982
& Supp. 1993)). See infra text accompanying note 117. The court did not .find a clear waiver
of sovereign immunity, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Washington, 872
F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989) that penalties were enforcement mechanisms as distinguished from
requirements. Ohio, 904 F.2d at 1059-60.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)). See infra text
accompanying note 99.
26. Ohio, 904 F.2d at 1062.
27. Id. at 1067 (Guy, J., dissenting).
28. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
11l S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
29. Id. at 1631.
30. A discussion of the provisions of RCRA is beyond the scope of this note.
31. 33 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). See infra text accompanying notes
160-64.
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BACKGROUND

In response to increasing environmental pollution problems in the
United States, Congress has enacted federal pollution laws, many of
which contain provisions for state and local enforcement.3 2 Ironically,
federal facilities are among the worst environmental polluters.33 Federal facility pollution creates a conflict when federal and state attempts to enforce environmental laws against federal facilities confront
the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity. 4 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a judicial doctrine founded on the ancient principle
that the King can do no wrong.35 The modern construction holds that
the government cannot be sued without its consent.
The United States Supreme Court demands that a waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal 6 and that waivers be "construed
strictly in favor of the sovereign." 37 Consequently, states may enforce
pollution laws at federal facilities, but only to the extent that Congress
has clearly and unequivocally waived federal sovereign immunity. 8
Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1948, 39 but substantially
amended it in 197240 to more closely resemble today's CWA. 41 The
stated purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 42
The 1972 Amendments changed the enforcement mechanisms of
the CWA to include compliance orders, civil actions for injunctive
relief, and civil penalties.43 The 1972 Amendments also established
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 44 which
requires permits to limit the release of contaminants at point sources

32. Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10326 (Oct. 1985).
33. J.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal
Facilities' Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 565 (1991).
34. Id. at 569-70.
35. BLcK's LAW DictIoNARY 1396 (6th ed. 1991).
36. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1633 (citing United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1980)).
37. Id. (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
39. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 18.
39. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. The act was called the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, or the Clean Water Act.
40. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816.
41. John P. Fogerty, A Short History of Federal Water Pollution Control Laws, in 1991
CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK 5-20 (1991).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
43. Fogerty, supra note 41, at 12.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss2/3

4

Matson: Waiver of Soveriegn Immunity - Did Congress Intend to Exempt Fede

CASENOTES

1993

to control water pollution. 45 The NPDES is a complex statutory system designed to eliminate all pollutant discharges.4 Under the NPDES,
it is unlawful to discharge a pollutant without a permit, and all permit
terms and conditions must be complied with. 47 Pollutant dischargers
must obtain permits in order to release permitted levels of contaminants. Permits are issued either by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)" or by states that have EPA-approved state programs.4 9 Once a state is authorized to administer its own EPA-approved program, the EPA has authority to review state-administered
programs50 and to withdraw approval for the program if the state is
not adhering to the minimum requirements established by the EPA."
The CWA requires the EPA to establish national standards of
performance for new sources of water pollutants5 2 and for toxic pollutants. 3 The national standards of performance established by the
EPA are the minimum standards that EPA-approved state programs
must administer and enforce. Compliance with a state-issued permit
constitutes compliance with the CWA.5 4 If a state has failed to enforce
the requirements of a state-issued permit, the EPA may directly enforce state permits as federal law requirements.5 5 State administration
and enforcement of their own programs are goals of NPDES. 56 Apstates have implemented programs which
proximately two-thirds of5 the
7
meet EPA requirements.
In 1976, two United States Supreme Court cases narrowly construed the waivers of federal sovereign immunity found in the federal59
facilities sections of the Clean Air Act 8 and the CWA. Hancock v.

45. Fogerty, supra note 41, at 12.

46. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1342(a).
§ 1342(b).
§ 1342(c).
§ 1316(b)(a)(B).

53. Id.§ 1317(a)(1).
54. Id.§ 1342(k).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(d) (1988).
57. Fogerty, supra note 41, at 12.
58. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1976). Section 118 of the CAA stated in
part: "Each department, agency and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government ... shall comply with Federal, State, interstate and local
requirements . . . to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements." 42
U.S.C. § 1857(0 (1964 & Supp. V) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1988 & Supp. II
1990)).
59. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 21112 (1976). The federal-facilities section of the CWA stated in part: "Each department, agency
or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government
. . . shall comply with Federal, State, interstate and local'requirements . . . to the same extent
that any person is subject to such requirements." 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)
(current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988)).
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Train6 and EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board6 addressed the CAA and the CWA, respectively. In both cases,
the Court found that "requirements" for federal facilities did not
include obtaining state-issued permits, which would allow state enforcement of those permits. Partly in response to the narrow interpretations of the waivers of sovereign immunity63 in these cases,
Congress amended both the CAA 62 and the CWA in 1977.64
Civil Penalties
Since the 1977 amendments, some courts have concluded that
civil penalties arising under federal, but not state, law fall within the
CWA's waiver of sovereign immunity. For example, the federal district court in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. United States Department of Navy6 considered a claim brought pursuant to the federalfacilities section6 of the CWA and found a broad waiver of federal
sovereign immunity in the first three sentences of the section. 67 The
court specifically found that "all . . .requirements" and "any proc-

ess and sanction" included state assessment of civil penalties at federal facilities. 68 It further noted that Congress's purpose in enacting
the CWA and the legislative history further supported "a blanket
waiver of sovereign immunity" that would include a state's entire
scheme for enforcing water pollution regulations, including civil penalties. 69 The court next considered the section's limitation on the waiver,
"the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or the process of such court, ' 70 and concluded that standards
or permits issued under an EPA-approved state program could meet

60. 426 U.S. 167 (1976). The Court ruled that Congress did not unambiguously waive
sovereign immunity in Section 118 of the CAA to require that federal facilities obtain stateissued permits under federally-approved plans.
61. 426 U.S. 200 (1976). The Court held that the word "requirement," in the federalfacilities section of the CWA, did not include state-issued, EPA-approved permits for federal
facilities. Id. at 227. The Court further stated that if Congress intended a different outcome,
"it may legislate to make that intention manifest." Id. at 227-28.
62. The CAA waiver was amended to require compliance with "all... requirements...

and process and sanctions ... to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity." Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I! 1990)) (emphasis added).

63. The CWA waiver was amended to require Federal cpmpliance with "all .. . requirements ... and process and sanctions ... to the same extent as any nongovernmental

entity." Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1597 (codified as 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a)(2) (1988)) (emphasis added).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 160-64.
65. 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ill. 1989), reh'g granted, 737 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. I11.
1990).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
67. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 722 F. Supp. at 1571.

68. Id. at 1569-70.
69. Id. at 1570.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
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that requirement. 7' On rehearing, civil penalties were not awarded
because Metropolitan Sanitary District did7 2not show that it was pursuing penalties arising under federal law.
At least one court has found the waiver of sovereign immunity
ambiguous. The federal district court in McClellan EcologicalSeepage
Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger" found that both the federal-facilities and citizen-suit 74 sections of the CWA were ambiguous and did
not express a clear waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Thus, the
court held that civil penalties could not be assessed against federal

polluters .
More recently, in Sierra Club v. Lujan, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court to authorize
civil penalties against a federal facility for violations arising under
an EPA-issued permit. 76 The appellate court found a clear waiver in
the federal-facilities section of the CWA by interpreting "sanctions"
to include civil penalties.7 7 Discussing the citizen-suit section, 7 the
court held that the definition of "person[s]" subject to civil penalties79
should be provided by the citizen-suit section's definition, which includes the United States, 0 rather than the CWA's general definition
section which
does not include the United States in the definition of
"person." 8 ' Consequently, the United States would be a "person"
subject to civil penalties. 2
On the issue of whether Congress had waived sovereign immunity
with regard to state-issued permits, two courts of appeals have come
to different conclusions. The Ninth Circuit, in California v. United
States Departmentof Navy, 3 considered only the federal-facilities section of the CWA and found that EPA-approved, state-issued permits
did not "arise under federal law," as required by that section. The

71. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 722 F. Supp. at 1572.
72. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 51, 52 (N.D. Il. 1990)
73. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
75. Mess, 655 F. Supp. at 604-05.
76. 931 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1927 (1992). The court went
on to note that MESS (655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986)) "has not enjoyed enthusiastic
acceptance." Id. at 1425.
77. Id. at 1427.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
79. Section 309(d) provides in part, -[a]ny person who violates [the permit provisions]
of this Act ... shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such
violation." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).

80. The citizen-suit section allows suit to be brought against any person, including the
United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
81. Section 502(5) of the CWA defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission or political subdivision of a state, or any
interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988).
82. Sierra Club, 931 F.2d at 1427.
83. 845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
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court noted that "Congress has delineated the respective roles of the
Administrator, the states, and private individuals under the CWA."U
It determined that the civil-penalties section85 authorized only the Administrator's enforcement powers under the CWA.8 6 One district court,
discussed earlier,1 7 has also addressed the issue of whether state-issued
permits under the CWA meet the requirement of "arising under federal law" in the federal-facilities section.88 The court in Metropolitan
Sanitary District v. United States Department of Navy 9 found that
the plaintiff did not assert that the violations arose under a stateoperated, EPA-approved program; therefore, the "arising under Federal law" requirement was not met. 90 In 1992, the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider whether federal facilities
are subject to civil penalties under the CWA, RCRA and state statutes
enacted pursuant to those programs.
PRINCIPAL CASE

In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether Congress waived federal sovereign immunity for state-imposed civil penalties for past violations under CWA, RCRA or state law. 91 The Court began by
"presum[ing] congressional familiarity ' 92 with the doctrine that waivers of federal sovereign immunity "must be unequivocal" 93 and "must
be 'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign." '94 The Court then
discussed the citizen-suit sections of both the CWA 95 and RCRA 96
together, since they are so similar. 97 Each citizen-suit section refers
to a civil-penalties section which provides remedies for citizen-suit
actions.
RCRA's citizen-suit section reads in part:

84. California, 845 F.2d at 225-26.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
86. California, 845 F.2d at 225-26. But see Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904
F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992) (finding a clear waiver of sovereign
immunity in the federal-facilities section of CWA [33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)] that extends to civil
penalties under federal or EPA-approved state water pollution laws).
87. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. I11. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes-65-72.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
89. 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. I11. 1989).
90. Id. at 1571-72. The Metropolitan Sanitary District was a local unit of government
and it was not clear whether it was pursuing federally sanctioned penalties. Id. at 1572.
91. United States Dep't of Energy. 112 S. Ct. at 1631.
92. Id. at 1633.
93. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-539 (1980)).
94. Id. (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. H 1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(1988)).
97. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1631.
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[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf
-

(1)(A) against any person (including ..

. the United States,

and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency...)
The district
who is alleged to be in violation of [this act] ....
court shall have jurisdiction to ... enforce [this act] . . . and

to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section [42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 (a) and (g)].91
The CWA's citizen-suit section states in part:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf
- (1) against any person (including ... the United States
The
...) who is alleged to be in violation of [this act] ....
district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order . . as the case

may be and, to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
[33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)]. 99

The Court focused on the definition of "person" as used in the
relevant sections. The citizen-suit sections of both the CWA and RCRA
provide that actions may be brought against any person, including
the United States. However, the civil-penalties sections, referred to
in the citizen-suit sections, do not include particular definitions of
"person[s]" subject to civil penalties. The Court determined that the
citizen-suit definitions of "person," which include the United States,
do not apply to the civil-penalties provisions. Instead, it held that
the general definitions of "person" in each act'00 apply to the civilpenalties sections.' 1
Consequently, although the United States is subject to citizen
suits, civil penalties are not available as a remedy against the United
States. Nonfederal polluters, who fall under the general definition of
"person" in each act, however, are subject to civil penalties. 0 2 The
Court justified this conclusion by relying on particular statutory drafting techniques. It noted that a statutory definition of "person" can
either encompass the entire section in which the term occurs, or apply

98. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(1988)).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version' at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
100. Section 1004 (15) of RCRA defines "person" as "an individual, trust, firm, joint
stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988)).
Section 502(5) of the CWA defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a state or any interstate
body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988)).
101. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1634.
102. Id. at 1635.
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only to a particular clause or sentence of that section. The Court
concluded that because the special definition of "person" in the citizen-suit sections is not specifically designated as applying to the entire
section, the definition is limited to the sentence or clause in which
it occurs. 103
The Court next addressed the CWA's federal-facilities section,
which reads in part:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government
...shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority,
and process and sanctions. .

.

. The preceding sentence shall

apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including . . . any other requirement, whatsoever), (B)

to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative
authority, and (C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner. . . . [T]he United States shall be liable only for those civil

penalties arising under Federal law.'

°4

Focusing on the meaning of "process and sanctions," the Court
recognized that "sanction[s]" can include coercive and punitive fines,
but found no reason to infer that punitive fines were intended. 05 In
its analysis of the statute's language regarding "process and sanctions," the Court noted that the section subjects the United States
to three types of governmental powers: substantive and procedural
requirements, administrative authority, and "process and sanctions.' 10 The Court inferred that Congress had used "sanctions" in
the coercive, but not punitive, sense for three reasons. 0 1 First, it noted
that "process and sanctions" (enforcement) is separate from substantive requirements in the text of the section. Second, it noted that
"process," which generally refers to the adjudicatory process, occurs
twice with "sanctions" in that section. Finally, the Court explained
that the section's reference to enforcement of "process and sanctions" in the courts generally means forward-looking orders which
are traditionally coercive sanctions. 08

103. Id. Interestingly, the paragraph of the citizen-suit section which includes the United
States as a "person" also refers to civil penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version
at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)) (emphasis
added).
105. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1637.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Court later distinguished punitive fines ("backward-looking penalties") from

coercive fines ("forward-looking orders enjoining future violators"). Id.
108. Id.at 1636-38.
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The Court then addressed Ohio's argument that the federal-facilities section's language, "[tihe United States shall be liable only
for those civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a
State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court," ,09
provides for assessing civil penalties against the United States under
EPA-approved state programs.'10 The Court concluded that the "civil
penalties arising under Federal law" passage is not contrary to the
Court's previous construction of "process and sanctions" as providing for coercive penalties only. It admitted that the section's subsequent reference to civil penalties suggests punitive fines, but decided
that a punitive fine interpretation "would raise a new and troublesome question.""' That question, according to the Court, is the source
of legal authority to impose a punitive fine. Since the Court had2
already decided that the first part of the federal-facilities section"
of the CWA did not authorize civil penalties against the United States,
the Court noted that there remained "an unanswered question and
an unresolved tension" between that construction and the section's
subsequent language subjecting the United States to civil penalties
arising under federal law." 3 The Court further admitted that it did
not know what Congress meant by the later civil penalty reference
in that section, and resolved the tension by determining that the language with regard to civil penalties was too uncertain to be a valid
waiver. 114

The Court also decided that the federal-facilities section's language "arising under Federal law" could be equated to federal-question jurisdiction" 5 where that language has been held "to exclude
cases in which the plaintiff relies on state law, even when the State's
exercise of power in the6 particular circumstances is expressly permitted by federal law.""1
Finally, the Court considered the federal-facilities section of
RCRA, which states in part:
Each department, agency and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government
.. . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and pro-

109. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).

110. United States Dep't of Energy. 112 S. Ct. at 1638.
111. Id.
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).
113. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1639.
114. Id.at 1638.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)).
116. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1638. The Court reasoned that its
previous reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 indicated that Congress's use of the same language
"indicates a likely adoption of" its prior determination. Id. at 1639.
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cedural (including any requirements for permits or reporting
or any provisions or injunctive relief and such sanctions as
may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief)." 7
The Court adopted the Tenth Circuit's 18 definition of "all requirements" in that section." 9 The Tenth Circuit interpreted "all requirements" as "including substantive standards and the means for
implementing those standards, but excluding punitive measures."' 120
The Court supported this interpretation by pointing to the statute's
silence on punitive sanctions and its specific mention of injunctive
relief as conclusive evidence of congressional intent.'
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens,
wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. 2 Justice White concurred
with the majority that the RCRA federal-facilities section" 3 is too
ambiguous to constitute a waiver. 24 However, Justice White pointed
out that in the remainder of its decision the majority 25had ignored
"the 'unequivocally expressed' intention of Congress."'1
Discussing the federal-facilities section of CWA,' 26 Justice White
stated that "a statute should be read as a whole.'" 12 Noting the majority's "tortured discussion" of "process and sanction," he suggested that the majority could have avoided that entire discussion by
reading further in the federal-facilities section where the words "civil
penalties" can be found: "[tihe United States shall be liable only for
those civil penalties arising under Federal law."'' 1 He concluded that
because the federal-facilities section specifically mentions the United
States' liability for civil penalties, the reference to "sanctions"
in the
129
earlier text of the section must include civil penalties.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op. 1982
& Supp. 1993)).
118. Mitzelfelt v. Dep't of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990).
119. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1639-40.
120. Id. (quoting Mitzelfelt v. Dep't of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990)).
121. Id. at 1640. The Court additionally pointed out that Ohio's argument that RCRA's
language was enacted in response to Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), was without merit
since Congress could have mentioned punitive fines if it wanted to. Id.
122. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1640 (White, J.,concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op. 1982
& Supp. 1993)).
124. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1644 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
125. Id. at 1641 (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992)).

126. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)).
127. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1640 (White, J.,concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
128. Id. at 1641 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)). The dissent pointed out that the majority's
dismissal of civil penalties contravenes "the 'ancient and sound rule of construction that each
word in a statute should, if possible, be given effect."' Id. (quoting Crandon v. U.S., 494
U.S. 152, 171 (1990) (Scalia, J.,concurring)).
129. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Turning to the phrase "arising under federal law," Justice White
declared that the CWA is an example of cooperative federalism and
cited Arkansas v. Oklahoma, "[the Clean Water Act anticipates a
30
In
partnership between the States and the Federal Government."'
in
inArkansas, the Court specifically allowed that state standards
3
terstate water controversies should be treated as federal law. ' Therestate law, but
fore, the dissent would have allowed penalties under
31 2
only if the state programs were EPA-approved.
Finally, Justice White summarily dismissed the majority's statutory construction of "person" in the citizen-suit provisions of CWA3 3
and RCRA 31 4 He argued that the special definitions of "person" in
those sections (which include the United States) surely apply to the
civil-penalties3 6 provisions 31 that the citizen-suit provisions expressly
incorporate.
ANALYSIS

In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court effectively ruled out the assessment of civil penalties against
the federal government under the CWA. The Court's strict construction of congressional waivers of sovereign immunity subverts the overall purpose of the CWA, which is "to restore and maintain the
37
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."'
Congress has enacted comprehensive plans to control water pollution,
38
and exemptions for federal agencies do not promote that objective.'
Federal facilities have generated tremendous amounts of pollution in recent years. 3 9 Their noncompliance with federal and state
pollution laws suggests that they require the same kinds of deterrents
that private polluters are subject to, in order to compel their compliance.
Nevertheless, the Court analyzed the plain language of the relevant statutory sections and concluded that Congress had not clearly

130. Id. at 1642 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992)).
131. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059.

132. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1643.
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)

(1988)).
135. The CWA civil-penalties provision is 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982) (current version at
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988)). RCRA's civil-penalties provision is 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 &
Supp. II 1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988)).
136. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1642 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
138. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 19.
139. For example, EPA's list of sites with significant RCRA noncompliance contained
thirty-two federal land disposal facilities. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGUtLATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1012 (1992).
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waived federal immunity. The Court did not consider legislative history, nor did it consider Congress's intent in enacting the CWA. Even
so, the Court should have found an unambiguous waiver of federal
sovereign immunity for federal facilities in the plain language of the
statute. As Justice White pointed out, the Court failed to look at the
statute as a whole.140
Statutory Language
The federal-facilities section of the CWA provides that "the Federal Government ...shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate and local requirements.' ' 4' The section further
provides immunity from civil penalties for officers, agents, or employees of the United States. It also states that the United States is
liable only for civil penalties arising under federal law. Finally, it
authorizes the President to exempt effluent sources of any department, agency or instrumentality of the executive branch from any
CWA federal facilities requirement if the exemption is deemed in the
paramount interest of the United States.'4 2 As the dissent noted, the
majority engaged in a "tortured discussion" of "process and sanctions," while neglecting the rest of the federal-facilities section, which
4
specifically refers to civil penalties.
The Court's interpretation of the later language in the federalfacilities section, "[t]he United States shall be liable only for those
civil penalties arising under federal law," left the phrase utterly devoid of meaning. First, the Court found the waiver in that phrase
too ambiguous to be effective, since it had already determined that
the previous language, "[t]he Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions" was
a waiver of sovereign immunity which excluded civil penalties for
federal facilities.'4 Second, in analogizing the "arising under federal
law" requirement to federal question jurisdiction, the Court failed
to acknowledge that the section's language does not refer to jurisdiction but, instead, is a limit on the federal government's liability

140. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
142. Id. The presidential exemption reads in part: "The President may exempt any effluent
source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance
with any such requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United
States to do so." Id.
143. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
144. Id. at 1636-37. See supra text accompanying' notes 109-16.
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for civil penalties under the Act" 5 It is more likely that the clause,
which was added by the 1977 Amendments, was meant to ensure that
the federal government would be subject only to civil penalties imposed pursuant to EPA-approved state programs.'14
The majority's interpretation of "person" as applied to the citizen-suit 47 and civil-penalties' 14 sections of the CWA is equally strained.

Subsection (a) of the citizen-suit section specifically states, "le]xcept
as provided by subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action . . . (1) against any person (including . . . the
United States . . . ) . . . . The district courts shall have jurisdiction
.. . to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an
order, . . . and to apply any appropriate civil penalties." 1 49 The lan-

guage indicates that subsection (b) 150 is the only limitation to a citizen
bringing an action. Furthermore, "civil penalties" is preceded by
"and," which indicates that this remedy is always available, if appropriate. There is no language in subsection (a) to indicate that the
initial definition of "person" has changed within the subsection.
Federalism
As Justice White noted, the CWA is an example of cooperative
federalism.' Federalism is a cornerstone of national environmental
pollution laws, e.g., CAA, CWA, RCRA. In enacting each of these
laws, Congress has encouraged a state-federal partnership. 52 Recently, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the CWA statefederal partnership. In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the Court recognized
"that the system of federally approved state standards
as applied in
5
the interstate context constitutes federal law.'
The CWA NPDES also supports the federalism concept. 5 4 The
NPDES permit system authorizes the EPA or states, through EPA145. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 26. The respondents point out that the purpose
of the language is not to prevent the "destruction of federal statutes by state courts," but to
shield "federal agencies from unauthorized penalties." Id. at 26-27.
146. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 9. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct.
1046 (1992).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988)) (the language is substantially the same).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988)) (the language is substantially the same).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988)) (emphasis
added).
150. Subsection (b) requires notice before an action is commenced.
151. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1642 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
152. Mike Rothmel, Note, When Will the Federal Government Waive the Sovereign Immunity Defense and Dispose of its Violations Properly? 65 Cm.-KNT L. REv. 581, 583 (1989).
153. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059. The Court noted that it has "long recognized that
interstate water pollution is controlled by federal law" and that "treating state standards in
interstate controversies as federal law accords with the Act's purpose of authorizing the EPA
to create and manage a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation." Id.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 44-57.
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approved programs, to issue permits under the CWA.' 5 If a facility
is in compliance with the requirements of its state-issued permit, it
is also deemed in compliance with the CWA.11 6 If a facility is not in
compliance with a state-issued permit and the state fails to enforce
the permit requirements, the EPA can enforce the state-issued permits
as federal law requirements.'1 7 In addition, the EPA retains oversight
of state programs and has the authority to withdraw approval of the
state programs.158 The interplay between state and federal duties and
the overlap of federal and state requirements strongly suggest that
the CWA was intended to be a working model of cooperative federalism and that violations of permits issued
under EPA-approved
59
state programs "arise under federal law.''
Legislative History
The Court did not look to legislative history for evidence of
Congress's intent, but instead chose to rely solely on the plain language of only a portion of the statute. The legislative history of the
1977 CWA amendments strongly suggests that Congress amended the
CWA and the CAA in 1977 at least partly in response to previous
United States Supreme Court decisions narrowly construing waivers
of federal sovereign immunity in the acts. 60 Discussing the 1977 CWA
amendments with regard to federal facility compliance, the Senate
committee stated:
The act has been amended to indicate unequivocally that all
Federal facilities and activities are subject to all of the provisions of State and local pollution laws. Though this was the
intent of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Supreme Court, encouraged by Federal agencies, has misconstrued the original
intent. 161
The 1977 Senate amendment for federal facility compliance is found
in the House conference report, which provided:
This section clarifies section 313 of the Act to provide that
all Federal facilities must comply with all substantive and pro-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
Id. § 1342(k).
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 24. See also Rothmel, supra note 152, at 603-

04.
160. See suprd notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
161. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4326, 4392 (emphasis added).
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cedural requirements of Federal, State, or local water pol162
lution control laws.
The conference substitute in the House report provided:
The conference substitute is essentially the same as the Senate
with a comparable provision
amendment revised to 6conform
3
of the Clean Air Act.
Congress also amended the comparable provision in the CAA in 1977.
Addressing federal facility compliance with the CAA, the House committee stated:
The amendment is also intended to resolve any questions about
the sanctions to which noncomplying Federal agencies, facilities, officers, employees or agents may be subject ....
This
means that Federal facilities and agencies may be subject to
injunctive relief (and criminal or civil contempt citations to
enforce .any such injunction), to civil or criminal penalties,
and to delayed compliance penalties. 1'
The legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the CWA and
the CAA clearly demonstrate that Congress did intend that federal
facilities be subject to civil penalties. That history emphasizes that
federal facilities must comply with all requirements of the CWA and
CAA. In addition, the Senate Committee specifically mentioned the
previous misconstruction of congressional intent by the United States
Supreme Court. Finally, the House report referred to the comparable
provision in the CAA which was also amended. Considering the CAA
amendment, the House committee declared specifically that federal
facilities would be subject to sanctions which include injunctive relief
and both civil and criminal penalties.
Policy
Continued exemption of federal polluters under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity undermines the objectives of federal environmental laws, especially in view of Congress's repeated attempts to
waive sovereign immunity. A government that receives its power from
the people maintains credibility by subjecting itself to the laws it

162. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4468 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1077, 1279 (emphasis added).
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promulgates. 65 As Justice Frankfurter said, the "[sovereign immunity
doctrine] undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of
the moral responsibility of the State."' 66
Congress has set federal pollution standards that apply to federal
facilities as well as to private parties. These standards have no teeth
with respect to federal facilities if compliance cannot be effectively
enforced. Available remedies at federal facilities include civil actions
for injunctive relief or compliance orders issued by a state or federal
administrator, but these remedies have not proven to be particularly
effective. In particular, compliance orders contain no enforcement
mechanism, so if a polluter chooses not to comply, the only alternative is to bring a civil suit for injunctive relief. Unfortunately, state
officials have had difficulty obtaining and enforcing injunctions. 6 7
Civil l5enalties are an important enforcement mechanism because they
encourage early compliance.1 68 The threat of civil penalties, which can
accrue from the beginning of the violation, provides a strong incentive6
to comply with environmental laws to avoid cumulative penalties.1 1
Injunctive relief can be obtained only after court proceedings and is
entirely prospective.I7o Consequently, a polluter might be inclined to
take advantage of the "free period" before an injunction is obtained. 17 ' Frequent use of civil penalties by the federal government
against non-federal polluters is evidence that they work."'
Additionally, one must consider the impact of federal pollution
on United States citizens. The economic consequences of federal pollution are staggering. Estimates show that United States taxpayers
will pay forty to seventy billion dollars over the next twenty years
to clean up DOE sites.'" If penalties were available as a remedy
against federal polluters, federal agencies' incentive to comply with

165. Elizabeth Cheng, Comment, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker:Assessing Civil Penalties Against
Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. CI. L. REV. 845, 861 (1990).

166. Breen, supra note 32, at 10327 (quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 59 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting)).
167. Wolverton, supra note 33, at 575 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL LIABILITIES
UNDER HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS, S. Doc. No. 95, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 25 (1990)).
168. Cheng, supra note 165, at 864.
169. Id.
170. Id. (confirmed in Cheng's telephone conversation with Dennis Harnish, Assistant
Attorney General, Maine, and Jack Van Clay, Assistant Attorney General, Ohio (April 20,
1990)).
171. Rothmel, supra note 152, at 585 n.43 (citing Brief for Plaintiffs, Ohio v. Department

of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988)).
172. Cheng, supra note 165, at 865.
173. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1640-41 (White, J.,concurring inpart
and dissenting in part) (citing Cleanup at Federal Facilities: Hearing on H.R. 765 before the
Subcommittee on Transportationand Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 101-04, p.44 (1989)).
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the law could save taxpayers substantial clean-up costs. 74 In addition,
all citizens would benefit from early compliance because federal polluters cause the same health and environmental problems as do private'
polluters.'75 These enormous problems would be decreased considerably if federal facilities complied with environmental laws.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio has completely ruled out the assessment of civil penalties against federal facilities under the CWA, RCRA, and state pollution laws promulgated under those statutes. In spite of Congress's
declarations as to the spirit and intent of these statutes, the United
States Supreme Court refused to find clear waivers of sovereign immunity for civil penalties as applied to federal facilities. Without this
remedy, enforcers will have to resort to civil actions for injunctive
relief to prevent federal environmental pollution. Pursuing injunctions
will require administrative watchfulness and continued use of the court
systems to curb violations before they become substantial.
United States citizens pay a very steep price for continued federal
facility violation of federal pollution laws. Obviously, this result could
not have been Congress's intent in formulating these nationwide pollution laws. The solution lies with Congress, which must, once again,
amend these statutes to unequivocally waive sovereign immunity for
federal facilities. Recently, Congress has begun to move in that direction. In October 1992, Congress passed the Federal Facility Compliance Act 7 6 to amend RCRA. 177 The act specifically subjects federal
facilities to civil penalties under RCRA. 17s Now Congress must turn
its attention to other federal pollution laws and do the same.
KAREN M. MATSON

174. Federal-law fines are paid to the federal treasury while state-law fines go to the state

treasury. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1632 n. I. Therefore fines would shift
federal monies from agencies to the federal treasury or to state treasuries. Political pressure
to comply, in order to avoid loss of agency funds, is a foreseeable consequence of federal
facilities expending funds for civil penalties.
175. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 9.
176. 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
177. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 6901-6987 (Law. Coop. 1982 & Supp. 1993).

178. A portion of section 6001 has been amended to read: "The Federal, State, interstate,
and local substantive and procedural requirements referred to in this subsection include, but
are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil and administrative penalties and fines,
regardless of whether such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed
for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations. The United States hereby expressly waives
any immunity otherwise applicable to the United States with respect to any such substantive
or procedural requirement (including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief, administrative

order or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge)". 42 U.S.C.S. § 6961 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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